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Abstract
Differential privacy is a framework for privately releasing summaries of a database. Previous work
has focused mainly on methods for which the output is a finite dimensional vector, or an element of
some discrete set. We develop methods for releasing functions while preserving differential privacy.
Specifically, we show that adding an appropriate Gaussian process to the function of interest yields
differential privacy. When the functions lie in the same RKHS as the Gaussian process, then the
correct noise level is established by measuring the “sensitivity” of the function in the RKHS norm.
As examples we consider kernel density estimation, kernel support vector machines, and functions in
reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces.
1 Introduction
Suppose we have database D which consists of measurements of a set of individuals. We want to release a
summary of D without compromising the privacy of those individuals in the database. One framework for
defining privacy rigorously in such problems is differential privacy [14, 11]. The basic idea is to produce
an output via random noise addition. An algorithm which does this may be thought of as inducing a
distribution PD on the output space (where the randomness is due to internal “coin flips” of the algorithm),
for every input data set D. Differential privacy, defined in Section 2, requires that PD not depend too
strongly on any single element of the database D.
The literature on differential privacy is vast. Algorithms that preserve differential privacy have been
developed for boosting, parameter estimation, clustering, logistic regression, SVM learning and many
other learning tasks. See, for example, [15], [8], [26], [9], [20], [16], [4], and references therein. In all these
cases, the data (both the input and output) are assumed to be real numbers or vectors. In this paper we
are concerned with a setting in which the output, and possibly the input data set, consist of functions.
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A concept that has been important in differential privacy is the “sensitivity” of the output [14]. In the
case of vector valued output the sensitivity is typically measured in the Euclidean norm or the `1-norm.
We find that when the output is a function the sensitivity may be measured in terms of an RKHS norm.
To establish privacy a Gaussian process may be added to the function with noise level calibrated to the
“RKHS sensitivity” of the output.
The motivation for considering function valued data is two-fold. First, in some problems the data are
naturally function valued, that is, each data point is a function. For example, growth curves, temperature
profiles, and economic indicators are often of this form. This has given rise to a subfield of statistics
known as functional data analysis (see, for instance [23]). Second, even if the data are not functions, we
may want to release a data summary that is a function. For example, if the data d1, . . . , dn ∈ Rd are
a sample from a distribution with density f then we can estimate the density with the kernel density
estimator
f̂(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
W
( ||x− di||
h
)
, x ∈ Rd,
where W is a kernel (see, for instance [27]) and h > 0 is the bandwidth parameter. The density estimator
is useful for may tasks such as clustering and classification. We may then want to release a “version” of
the density estimator f̂ in a way which fulfills the criteria of differential privacy. The utility of such a
procedure goes beyond merely estimating the underlying density. In fact, suppose the goal is to release a
privatized database. With a differentially private density estimator in hand, a large sample of data may
be drawn from that density. The release of such a sample would inherit the differential privacy properties
of the density estimator: see, in particular, [28] and [17]. This is a very attractive proposition, since
a differentially private sample of data could be used as the basis for any number of statistical analyses
which may have been brought to bear against the original data (for instance, exploratory data analysis,
model fitting, etc).
Histograms are an example of a density estimator that has been “privatized” in previous literature [28,
10]. However, as density estimators, histograms are suboptimal because they are not smooth. Specifically,
they do converge at the minimax rate under the assumption that the true density is smooth. The preferred
method for density estimation in statistics is kernel density estimation. The methods developed in this
paper lead to a private kernel density estimator.
In addition to kernel density estimation, there are a myriad of other scenarios in which the result of
a statistical analysis is a function. For example, the regression function or classification function from a
supervised learning task. We demonstrate how the theory we develop may be applied in these contexts
as well.
Outline. We introduce some notation and review the definition of differential privacy in Section 2.
We also give a demonstration of a technique to achieve the differential privacy for a vector valued output.
The theory for demonstrating differentially privacy of functions is established in Section 3. In Section
4 we apply the theory to the problems of kernel density estimation and kernel SVM learning. We also
demonstrate how the theory may apply to a broad class of functions (a Sobolev space). Section 5 discusses
possible algorithms for outputting functions.
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2 Differential Privacy
Here we recall the definition of differential privacy and introduce some notation. Let D = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ D
be an input database in which di represents a row or an individual, and where D is the space of all such
databases of n elements. For two databases D,D′, we say they are “adjacent” or “neighboring” and write
D ∼ D′ whenever both have the same number of elements, but differ in one element. In other words,
there exists a permutation of D having Hamming distance of 2 to D′. In some other works databases are
called “adjacent” whenever one database contains the other together with exactly one additional element.
We may characterize a non-private algorithm in terms of the function it outputs, e.g., θ : D → Rd. Thus
we write θD = θ(D) to mean the output when the input database is D. Thus, a computer program which
outputs a vector may be characterized as a family of vectors {θD : D ∈ D}, one for every possible input
database. Likewise a computer program which is randomized may be characterized by the distributions
{PD : D ∈ D} it induces on the output space (e.g., Rd) when the input is D. We consider randomized
algorithms where the input is a database in D and the output takes values in a measurable space Ω
endowed with the σ-field A. Thus, to each such algorithm there correspond the set of distributions
{PD : D ∈ D} on (Ω,A) indexed by databases. We phrase the definition of differential privacy using this
characterization of randomized algorithms.
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy). A set of distributions {PD : D ∈ D} is called (α, β)-differentially
private, or said to “achieve (α, β)-DP” whenever for all D ∼ D′ ∈ D we have:
PD(A) ≤ eαPD′(A) + β, ∀A ∈ A, (1)
where α, β ≥ 0 are parameters, and A is the finest σ-field on which all PD are defined.
Typically the above definition is called “approximate differential privacy” whenever β > 0, and “(α, 0)-
differential privacy” is shortened to “α-differential privacy.” It is important to note that the relation D ∼
D′ is symmetric, and so the inequality (1) is required to hold when D and D′ are swapped. Throughout
this paper we take α ≤ 1, since this simplifies some proofs.
The σ-field A is rarely mentioned in the literature on differential privacy but is actually quite im-
portant. For example if we were to take A = {Ω, ∅} then the condition (1) is trivially satisfied by any
randomized algorithm. To make the definition as strong as possible we insist that A be the finest available
σ-field on which the PD are defined. Therefore when Ω is discrete the typical σ-field is A = 2Ω (the class
of all subsets of Ω), and when Ω is a space with a topology it is typical to use the completion of the
Borel σ-field (the smallest σ-field containing all open sets). We raise this point since when Ω is a space
of functions, the choice of σ-field is more delicate.
2.1 Differential Privacy of Finite Dimensional Vectors
[12] give a technique to achieve approximate differential privacy for general vector valued outputs in
which the “sensitivity” may be bounded. We review this below, since the result is important in the
demonstration of the privacy of our methods which output functions. What follows in this section is a
mild alteration to the technique developed by [12] and [18], in that the “sensitivity” of the class of vectors
is measured in the Mahalanobis distance rather than the usual Euclidean distance.
In demonstrating the differential privacy, we make use of the following lemma which is simply an
explicit statement of an argument used in a proof by [12].
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Lemma 2.2. Suppose that, for all D ∼ D′, there exists a set A?D,D′ ∈ A such that, for all S ∈ A,
S ⊆ A?D,D′ ⇒ PD(S) ≤ eαPD′(S) (2)
and
PD(A
?
D,D′) ≥ 1− β. (3)
Then the family {PD} achieves the (α, β)-DP.
Proof. Let S ∈ A. Then,
PD(S) = PD(S ∩A?) + PD(S ∩A?C) ≤ PD(S ∩A?) + β
≤ eαPD′(S ∩A?) + β ≤ eαPD′(S) + β.
The first inequality is due to (3), the second is due to (2) and the third is due to the subadditivity of
measures.
The above result shows that, so long as there is a large enough (in terms of the measure PD) set on which
the (α, 0)-DP condition holds, then the approximate (α, β)-DP is achieved.
Remark 2.3. If (Ω,A) has a σ-finite dominating measure λ, then for (2) to hold a sufficient condition is
that the ratio of the densities be bounded on some set A?D,D′ :
∀a ∈ A?D,D′ :
dPD
dλ
(a) ≤ eαdPD′
dλ
(a). (4)
This follows from the inequality
PD(S) =
∫
S
dPD
dλ
(a) dλ(a) ≤
∫
S
eα
dPD′
dλ
(a) dλ(a) = eαPD′(S).
In our next result we show that approximate differential privacy is achieved via (4) when the output
is a real vector, say vD = v(D) ∈ Rd, whose dimension does not depend on the database D. An example
is when the database elements di ∈ Rd and the output is the mean vector v(D) = n−1
∑n
i=1 di.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that, for a positive definite symmetric matrix M ∈ Rd×d, the family of vectors
{vD : D ∈ D} ⊂ Rd satisfies
sup
D∼D′
‖M−1/2(vD − vD′)‖2 ≤ ∆. (5)
Then the randomized algorithm which, for input database D outputs
v˜D = vD +
c(β)∆
α
Z, Z ∼ Nd(0,M)
achieves (α, β)-DP whenever
c(β) ≥
√
2 log
2
β
. (6)
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Proof. Since the Gaussian measure on Rd admits the Lebesgue measure λ as a σ-finite dominating measure
we consider the ratio of the densities
dPD(x)/dλ
dPD′(x)/dλ
= exp
{
α2
2c(β)2∆2
[
(x− vD′)M−1(x− vD′)− (x− vD)TM−1(x− vD)
]}
.
This ratio exceeds eα only when
2xTM−1(vD − vD′) + vTD′M−1vD′ − vTDM−1vD ≥ 2
c(β)2∆2
α
.
We consider the probability of this set under PD, in which case we have x = vD +
c(β)∆
α M
1/2z, where z
is an isotropic normal with unit variance. We have
c(β)∆
α
zTM−1/2(vD − vD′) ≥ c(β)
2∆2
α2
− 1
2
(vD − vD′)TM−1(vD − vD′).
Multiplying by αc(β)∆ and using (5) gives
zTM−1/2(vD − vD′) ≥ c(β)∆
α
− α∆
2c(β)
.
Note that the left side is a normal random variable with mean zero and variance smaller than ∆2. The
probability of this set is increasing with the variance of said variable, and so we examine the probability
when the variance equals ∆2. We also restrict to α ≤ 1, and let y ∼ N (0, 1), yielding
P
(
zTM−1/2(vD − vD′) ≥ c(β)∆
α
− α∆
2c(β)
)
≤ P
(
∆y ≥ c(β)∆
α
− α∆
2c(β)
)
≤ P
(
y ≥ c(β)− 1
2c(β)
)
≤ β,
where c(β) is as defined in (6) and the final inequality is proved in [11]. Thus lemma 2.2 gives the
differential privacy.
Remark 2.5. The quantity (5) is a mild modification of the usual notion of “sensitivity” or “global sensi-
tivity” [14]. It is nothing more than the sensitivity measured in the Mahalanobis distance corresponding
to the matrix M . The case M = I corresponds to the usual Euclidean distance, a setting that has been
studied previously by [18], among others.
2.2 The Implications of Approximate Differential Privacy
The above definitions provide a strong privacy guarantee in the sense that they aim to protect against an
adversary having almost complete knowledge of the private database. Specifically, an adversary knowing
all but one of the data elements and having observed the output of a private procedure, will remain unable
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to determine the identity of the data element which is unknown to him. To see this, we provide an analog
of theorem 2.4 of [28], who consider the case of α-differential privacy.
Let the adversary’s database be denoted by DA = (d1, . . . , dn−1), and the private database by D =
(d1, . . . , dn). First note that before observing the output of the private algorithm, the adversary could
determine that the private database D lay in the set {(d1, . . . , dn−1, d) ∈ D} . Thus, the private database
comprises his data with one more element. Since all other databases may be excluded from consideration
by the adversary we concentrate on those in the above set. In particular, we obtain the following analog
of theorem 2.4 of [28].
Proposition 2.6. Let X ∼ PD where the family PD achieves the (α, β)-approximate DP. Any level γ test
of: H : D = D0 vs V : D 6= D0 has power bounded above by γeα + β.
The above result follows immediately from noting that the rejection region of the test is a measurable
set in the space and so obeys the constraint of the differential privacy. The implication of the above
proposition is that the power of the test will be bounded close to its size. When α, β are small, this means
that the test is close to being “trivial” in the sense that it is no more likely to correctly reject a false
hypothesis than it is to incorrectly reject the true one.
3 Approximate Differential Privacy for Functions
The goal of the release a function raises a number of questions. First what does it mean for a computer
program to output a function? Second, how can the differential privacy be demonstrated? In this section
we continue to treat randomized algorithms as measures, however now they are measures over function
spaces. In section 5 we demonstrate concrete algorithms, which in essence output the function on any
arbitrary countable set of points.
We cannot expect the techniques for finite dimensional vectors to apply directly when dealing with
functions. The reason is that σ-finite dominating measures of the space of functions do not exist, and,
therefore, neither do densities. However, there exist probability measures on the spaces of functions.
Below, we demonstrate the approximate differential privacy of measures on function spaces, by considering
random variables which correspond to evaluating the random function on a finite set of points.
We consider the family of functions over T = Rd (where appropriate we may restrict to a compact
subset such as the unit cube in d-dimensions):
{fD : D ∈ D} ⊂ RT .
A before, we consider randomized algorithms which on input D, output some f˜D ∼ PD where PD is
a measure on RT corresponding to D. The nature of the σ-field on this space will be described below.
3.1 Differential Privacy on the Field of Cylinders
We define the “cylinder sets” of functions (see [6]) for all finite subsets S = (x1, . . . , xn) of T , and Borel
sets B of Rn
CS,B =
{
f ∈ RT : (f(x1), . . . , f(xn)) ∈ B
}
.
These are just those functions which take values in prescribed sets, at those points in S. The family of
sets: CS = {CS,B : B ∈ B(Rn)} forms a σ-field for each fixed S, since it is the preimage of B(Rn) under
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the operation of evaluation on the fixed finite set S. Taking the union over all finite sets S yields the
collection
F0 =
⋃
S:|S|<∞
CS .
This is a field (see [6] page 508) although not a σ-field, since it does not have the requisite closure under
countable intersections (namely it does not contain cylinder sets for which S is countably infinite). We
focus on the creation of algorithms for which the differential privacy holds over the field of cylinder sets,
in the sense that, for all D ∼ D′ ∈ D,
P (f˜D ∈ A) ≤ eαP (f˜D′ ∈ A) + β, ∀A ∈ F0. (7)
This statement appears to be prima facie unlike the definition (1), since F0 is not a σ-field on RT .
However, we give a limiting argument which demonstrates that to satisfy (7) is to achieve the approximate
(α, β)-DP throughout the generated σ-field. First we note that satisfying (7) implies that the release of
any finite evaluation of the function achieves the differential privacy. Since for any finite S ⊂ T , we have
that CS ⊂ F0, we readily obtain the following result.
Proposition 3.1. Let x1, . . . , xn be any finite set of points in T chosen a-priori. Then whenever (7)
holds, the release of the vector (
f˜D(x1), . . . , f˜D(xn)
)
satisfies the (α, β)-DP.
Proof. We have that
PD
((
f˜(x1), . . . , f˜(xn)
)
∈ A
)
= PD(f˜ ∈ C{x1,...,xn},A).
The claimed privacy guarantee follows from (7).
We now give a limiting argument to extend (7) to the generated σ-field (or, equivalently, the σ-field
generated by the cylinders of dimension 1)
F def= σ(F0) =
⋃
S
CS
where the union extends over all the countable subsets S of T . The second equality above is due to [6]
theorem 36.3 part ii.
Note that, for countable S, the cylinder sets take the form
CS,B =
{
f ∈ RT : f(xi) ∈ Bi, i = 1, 2, . . .
}
=
∞⋂
i=1
C{xi},Bi ,
where Bi’s are Borel sets of R.
Proposition 3.2. Let (7) hold. Then, the family {PD : D ∈ D} on (RT ,F) satisfies for all D ∼ D′ ∈ D:
PD(A) ≤ eαPD′(A) + β, ∀A ∈ F . (8)
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Proof. Define CS,B,n =
⋂n
i=1C{ti},Bi . Then, the sets CS,B,n form a sequence of sets which decreases
towards CS,B and CS,B = limn→∞CS,B,n. Since the sequence of sets is decreasing and the measure in
question is a probability (hence bounded above by 1), we have
PD(CS,B) = PD( lim
n→∞CS,B,n) = limn→∞PD(CS,B,n).
Therefore, for each pair D ∼ D′ and for every  > 0, there exists an n0 so that for all n ≥ n0
|PD(CS,B)− PD(CS,B,n)| ≤ , |PD′(CS,B)− PD′(CS,B,n)| ≤ .
The number n0 depends on whichever is the slowest sequence to converge. Finally we obtain
PD(CS,B) ≤ PD(CS,B,n0) + 
≤ eαPD′(CS,B,n0) + β + 
≤ eαPD′(CS,B) + β + (1 + eα)
≤ eαPD′(CS,B) + β + 3.
Since this holds for all  > 0 we conclude that PD(CS,B) ≤ eαPD′(CS,B) + β.
In principle, if it were possible for a computer to release a complete description of the function
f˜D then this result would demonstrate the privacy guarantee achieved by our algorithm. In practise a
computer algorithm which runs in a finite amount of time may only output a finite set of points, hence
this result is mainly of theoretical interest. However, in the case in which the functions to be output
are continuous, and the restriction is made that PD are measures over C[0, 1] (the continuous functions
on the unit interval), another description of the σ-field becomes available. Namely, the restriction of F
to the elements of C[0, 1] corresponds to the borel σ-field over C[0, 1] with the topology induced by the
uniform norm (‖f‖∞ = supt |f(t)|). Therefore in the case of continuous functions, differential privacy
over F0 hence leads to differential privacy throughout the borel σ-field.
In summary, we find that if every finite dimensional projection of the released function satisfies dif-
ferential privacy, then so does every countable-dimensional projection. We now explore techniques which
achieve the differential privacy over these σ-fields.
3.2 Differential Privacy via the Exponential Mechanism
A straightforward means to output a function in a way which achieves the differential privacy is to make
use of the so-called “exponential mechanism” of [19]. This approach entails the construction of a suitable
finite set of functions G = {gi, . . . , gm} ∈ RT , in which every fD has a reasonable approximation, under
some distance function d. Then, when the input is D, a function is chosen to output by sampling the set
of G with probabilities given by
PD(gi) ∝ exp
{−α
2
d(gi, fD)
}
.
[19] demonstrate that such a technique achieves the α-differential privacy, which is strictly stronger than
the (α, β)-differential privacy we consider here. Although this technique is conceptually appealing for
its simplicity, it remains challenging to use in practise since the set of functions G may need to be very
large in order to ensure the utility of the released function (in the sense of expected error). Since the
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algorithm which outputs from PD must obtain the normalization constant to the distribution above, it
must evidently compute the probabilities for each gi, which may be extremely time consuming. Note that
techniques such as importance sampling are also difficult to bring to bear against this problem when it is
important to maintain utility.
The technique given above can be interpreted as outputting a discrete random variable, and fulfilling
privacy definition with respect to the σ-field consisting of the powerset of G. This implies the privacy
with respect to the cylinder sets, since the restriction of each cylinder set to the elements of G corresponds
some subset of G.
We note that the exponential mechanism above essentially corresponded to a discretization of the
function space RT . An alternative is to discretize the input space T , and to approximate the function
by a piecewise constant function where the pieces correspond to the discretization of T . Thereupon the
approximation may be regarded as a real valued vector, with one entry for the value of each piece of the
function. This is conceptually appealing but it remains to be seen whether the sensitivity of such a vector
valued output could be bounded. In the next section we describe a method which may be regarded as
similar to the above, and which has the nice property that the choice of discretization is immaterial to
the method and to the determination of sensitivity.
3.3 Differential Privacy via Gaussian Process Noise
We propose to use measures PD over functions, which are Gaussian processes. The reason is that there is a
strong connection between these measures over the infinite dimensional function space, and the Gaussian
measures over finite dimensional vector spaces such as those used in Proposition 2.4. Therefore, with
some additional technical machinery which we will illustrate next, it is possible to move from differentially
private measures over vectors to those over functions.
A Gaussian process indexed by T is a collection of random variables {Xt : t ∈ T}, for which each
finite subset is distributed as a multivariate Gaussian (see, for instance, [1, 2]). A sample from a Gaussian
process may be considered as a function T → R, by examining the so-called “sample path” t→ Xt. The
Gaussian process is determined by the mean and covariance functions, defined on T and T 2 respectively,
as
m(t) = EXt, K(s, t) = Cov(Xs, Xt).
For any finite subset S ⊂ T , the random vector {Xt : t ∈ S} has a normal distribution with the means,
variances, and covariances given by the above functions. Such a “finite dimensional distribution” may
be regarded as a projection of the Gaussian process. Below we propose particular mean and covariance
functions for which Proposition 2.4 will hold for all finite dimensional distributions. These will require
some smoothness properties of the family of functions {fD}. We first demonstrate the technical machinery
which allows us to move from finite dimensional distributions to distributions on the function space, and
then we give differentially private measures on function spaces of one dimension. Finally, we extend our
results to multiple dimensions.
Proposition 3.3. Let G be a sample path of a Gaussian process having mean zero and covariance function
K. Let {fD : D ∈ D} be a family of functions indexed by databases. Then the release of
f˜D = fD +
∆c(β)
α
G
9
is (α, β)-differentially private (with respect to the cylinder σ-field F) whenever
sup
D∼D′
sup
n<∞
sup
(x1,...,xn)∈Tn
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 K(x1, x1) · · · K(x1, xn)... . . . ...
K(xn, x1) · · · K(xn, xn)

−1/2 fD(x1)− fD′(x1)...
fD(xn)− fD′(xn)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ∆. (9)
Proof. For any finite set (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Tn, the vector (G(x1), . . . , G(xn)) follows a multivariate normal
distribution having mean zero and covariance matrix specified by Cov(G(xi), G(xj)) = K(xi, xj). Thus
for the vector obtained by evaluation of f˜ at those points, differential privacy is demonstrated by Propo-
sition 2.4 since (9) implies the sensitivity bound (5). Thus, for any n <∞ and any (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Tn we
have B ∈ B(Rn)
PD
((
f˜(x1), . . . , f˜(xn)
)
∈ B
)
≤ eαPD′
((
f˜(x1), . . . , f˜(xn)
)
∈ B
)
+ β
Finally note that for any A ∈ F0, we may write A = CXn,B for some finite n, some vector Xn =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Tn and some borel set B. Then
PD(f˜ ∈ A) = PD
((
f˜(x1), . . . , f˜(xn)
)
∈ B
)
.
Combining this with the above gives the requisite privacy statement for all A ∈ F0. Proposition 3.2
carries this to F .
3.4 Functions in a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space
When the family of functions lies in the reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) which corresponds to
the covariance kernel of the Gaussian process, then establishing upper bounds of the form (9) is simple.
Below, we give some basic definitions for RKHSs, and refer the reader to [5] for a more detailed account.
We first recall that the RKHS is generated from the closure of those functions which can be represented
as finite linear combinations of the kernel, i.e.,
H0 =
{
n∑
i=1
ξiKxi
}
for some finite n and sequence ξi ∈ R, xi ∈ T , and where Kx = K(x, ·). For two functions f =
∑n
i=1 θiKxi
and g =
∑m
j=1 ξjKyj the inner product is given by
〈f, g〉H =
n∑
i=1
∑
j=1m
θiξjK(xi, yj),
and the corresponding norm of f is ‖f‖H =
√〈f, f〉H. This gives rise to the “reproducing” nature of the
Hilbert space, namely, 〈Kx,Ky〉H = K(x, y). Furthermore, the functionals 〈Kx, ·〉H correspond to point
evaluation, i.e.
〈Kx, f〉H =
n∑
i=1
θiK(xi, x) = f(x).
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The RKHS H is then the closure of H0 with respect to the RKHS norm. We now present the main
theorem which suggests an upper bound of the form required in Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.4. For f ∈ H, where H is the RKHS corresponding to the kernel K, and for any finite
sequence x1, . . . , xn of distinct points in T , we have:∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 K(x1, x1) · · · K(x1, xn)... . . . ...
K(xn, x1) · · · K(xn, xn)

−1/2 f(x1)...
f(xn)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ‖f‖H.
The proof is in the appendix. Together with Proposition 3.3, this result implies the following.
Corollary 3.5. For {fD : D ∈ D} ⊆ H, the release of
f˜D = fD +
∆c(β)
α
G
is (α, β)-differentially private (with respect to the cylinder σ-field) whenever
∆ ≥ sup
D∼D′
‖fD − fD′‖H.
and when G is the sample path of a Gaussian process having mean zero and covariance function K, given
by the reproducing kernel of H.
4 Examples
We now give some examples in which the above technique may be used to construct private versions of
functions in an RKHS.
4.1 Kernel Density Estimation
Let fD be the kernel density estimator, where D is regarded as a sequence of points xi ∈ T as i = 1, . . . , n
drawn from a distribution with density f . Let h denote the bandwidth. Assuming a Gaussian kernel, the
estimator is
fD(x) =
1
n(2pih2)d/2
n∑
i=1
exp
{−‖x− xi‖22
2h2
}
, x ∈ T.
Let D ∼ D′ so that D′ = x1, . . . , xn−1, x′n (no loss of generality is incurred by demanding that the
data sequences differ in their last element). Then,
(fD − fD′)(x) = 1
n(2pih2)d/2
(
exp
{
−‖x− xn‖
2
2
2h2
}
− exp
{
−‖x− x
′
n‖22
2h2
})
.
If we use the Gaussian kernel as the covariance function for the Gaussian process then upper bounding
the RKHS norm of this function is trivial. Thus, let K(x, y) = exp
{
−‖x−y‖22
2h2
}
. Then fD − fD′ =
11
1
n(2pih2)d/2
(
Kxn −Kx′n
)
and
‖fD − fD′‖2H =
(
1
n(2pih2)d/2
)2 (
K(xn, xn) +K(x
′
n, x
′
n)− 2K(xn, x′n)
)
≤ 2
(
1
n(2pih2)d/2
)2
.
If we release
f˜D = fD +
c(β)
√
2
αn(2pih2)d/2
G
where G is a sample path of a Gaussian process having mean zero and covariance K, then differential
privacy is demonstrated by corollary 3.5. We may compare the utility of the released estimator to that
of the non-private version. Under standard smoothness assumptions on f , it is well-known (see [27]) that
the risk is
R = E
∫
(fD(x)− f(x))2dx = c1h4 + c2
nhd
,
for some constants c1 and c2. The optimal bandwidth is h  (1/n)1/(4+d) in which case R = O(n−
4
4+d ).
For the differentially private function it is easy to see that
E
∫
(f˜D(x)− f(x))2dx = O
(
h4 +
c2
nhd
)
.
Therefore, at least in terms of rates, no accuracy has been lost.
4.1.1 Non-Isotropic Kernels
The above demonstration of privacy also holds when the kernel is replaced by a non-isotropic Gaussian
kernel. In this case the kernel density estimate may take the form
fD(x) =
1
n(2pi)d/2|H|1/2
n∑
i=1
exp
{
−1
2
(x− xi)TH−1(x− xi)
}
, x ∈ T,
where H is a positive definite matrix and |H| is the determinant. For example it may be required to
employ a different choice of bandwidth for each coordinate of the space, in which case H would be a
diagonal matrix having non-equal entries on the diagonal. So long as H is fixed a-priori, privacy may be
established by adding a Gaussian process having mean zero and covariance given by
K(x, y) = exp
{
−1
2
(x− y)TH−1(x− y)
}
.
As above, the sensitivity is upper bounded, as
‖fD − fD′‖2H ≤ 2
(
1
n(2pi)d/2|H|1/2
)2
.
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Figure 1: An example of a kernel density estimator (the black curve) and the released version (the blue
curve). This uses the method developed in Section 4.1. Here we sampled n = 100 points from a mixture
of two normals centered at 0.3 and 0.7 respectively. We use h = 0.1 and have α = 1 and β = 0.1. The
Gaussian Process is evaluated on an evenly spaced grid of 1000 points between 0 and 1. Note that gross
features of the original kernel density estimator remain, namely the two peaks.
Therefore it satisfies the (α, β)-DP to release
f˜D = fD +
c(β)
√
2
αn(2pi)d/2|H|1/2G,
where G is a sample path of a Gaussian process having mean zero and covariance K.
4.1.2 Private Choice of Bandwidth
Note that the above assumed that h (or H) was fixed a-priori by the user. In usual statistical settings h
is a parameter that is tuned depending on the data (not simply set to the correct order of growth as a
function of n). Thus rather than fixed h the user would use ĥ which depends on the data itself. In order
to do this it is necessary to find a differentially private version of ĥ and then to employ the composition
property of differential privacy (citation).
The typical way that the bandwidth is selected is by employing the leave-one-out cross validation.
This consists of choosing a grid of candidate values for h, evaluating the leave one out log likelihood for
each value, and then choosing whichever is the maximizer. This technique may be amenable to private
analysis via the “exponential mechanism” of (citation), however it would evidently require that T be a
compact set which is known a-priori. An alternative is to use a “rule of thumb” (see [25]) for determining
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the bandwidth which is given by
ĥj =
(
4
(d+ 1)n
) 1
d+4 IQRj
1.34
In which IQRj is the observed interquartile range of the data along the j
th coordinate. Thus this method
gives a diagonal matrix H as in the above section. To make a private version h˜j we may use the technique
of [13] in which a differentially private algorithm for the interquartile range was developed.
4.2 Functions in a Sobolev Space
The above technique worked easily since we chose a particular RKHS in which we knew the kernel density
estimator to live. What’s more, since the functions themselves lay in the generating set of functions for that
space, the determination of the norm of the difference fD − fD′ was extremely simple. In general we may
not be so lucky that the family of functions is amenable to such analysis. In this section we demonstrate
a more broadly applicable technique which may be used whenever the functions are sufficiently smooth.
Consider the Sobolev space
H1[0, 1] =
{
f ∈ C[0, 1] :
∫ 1
0
(∂f(x))2 dλ(x) <∞
}
.
This is a RKHS with the kernel K(x, y) = exp {−γ |x− y|} for positive constant γ. The norm in this
space is given by
‖f‖2H =
1
2
(
f(0)2 + f(1))2
)
+
1
2γ
∫ 1
0
(∂f(x))2 + γ2f(t)2 dλ(t). (10)
See e.g., [5] (p. 316) and [21] for details. Thus for a family of functions in one dimension which lay in
the Sobolev space H1, we may determine a noise level necessary to achieve the differential privacy by
bounding the above quantity for the difference of two functions. For functions over higher dimensional
domains (as [0, 1]d for some d > 1) we may construct an RKHS by taking the d-fold tensor product of
the above RKHS (see, in particular [22, 3] for details on the construction). The resulting space has the
reproducing kernel
K(x, y) = exp {−γ‖x− y‖1} ,
and is the completion of the set of functions
G0 =
{
f : [0, 1]d → R : f(x1, . . . , xd) = f1(x1) · · · fd(xd), fi ∈ H1[0, 1]
}
.
The norm over this set of functions is given by:
‖f‖2G0 =
d∏
j=1
‖fi‖2H. (11)
The norm over the completed space agrees with the above on G0. The explicit form is obtained
by substituting (10) into the right hand side of (11) and replacing all instances of
∏d
j=1 fj(xj) with
f(x1, . . . , xj). Thus the norm in the completed space is defined for all f possessing all first partial
derivatives which are all in L2.
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We revisit the example of a kernel density estimator (with an isotropic Gaussian kernel). We note
that this isotropic kernel function is in the set G0 defined above, as
φµ,h(x) =
1
(2pih2)d/2
exp
{
−‖x− µ‖
2
2
2h2
}
=
d∏
j=1
1√
2pih
exp
{
−(xj − µj)
2
2h2
}
=
d∏
j=1
φµj ,h(xj).
Where φµ,h is the isotropic Gaussian kernel on Rd with mean vector µ and φµj ,h is the Gaussian kernel
in one dimension with mean µj . We obtain the norm of the latter one dimensional function by bounding
the elements of the sum in (10) ad follows:∫ 1
0
(∂φµj ,h(x))
2 dλ(x) ≤
∫ ∞
−∞
(
∂
1√
2pih
e−(x−µj)
2/2h2
)2
dλ(x) =
1
4
√
pih3
,
and
∫ 1
0
φµj ,h(x)
2 dλ(x) ≤
∫ ∞
−∞
1
2pih2
e−(x−µj)
2/h2 dλ(x) =
1
2
√
2pih
,
where we have used the fact that
φµj ,h(x)
2 ≤ 1
2pih
, ∀x ∈ Rd.
Therefore, choosing γ = 1/h leads to
‖φµj ,h‖2H ≤
1
2pih2
+
1
8
√
pih2
+
1
4
√
2pih2
≤ 1√
2pih2
,
and
‖φµ,h‖2H ≤
1
(2pi)d/2h2d
.
Finally,
‖fD − fD′‖H = n−1‖φxn,h − φx′n,h‖H ≤
2
(2pi)d/4nhd
Therefore, we observe a technique which attains higher generality than the ad-hoc analysis of the
preceding section. However this is at the expense of the noise level, which grows at a higher rate as d
increases. An example of the technique applied to the same kernel density estimation problem as above
is given in Figure 2.
4.3 Minimizers of Regularized Functionals in an RKHS
The construction of the following section is due to [7], who were interested in determining the sensitivity
of certain kernel machines (among other algorithms) with the aim of bounding the generalization error
of the output classifiers. [24] noted that these bounds are useful for establishing the noise level required
for differential privacy of support vector machines. They are also useful for our approach to privacy in a
function space.
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Figure 2: An example of a kernel density estimator (the black curve) and the released version (the blue
curve). The setup is the same as in Figure 1, but the privacy mechanism developed in Section 4.2 was
used instead. Note that the released function does not have the desirable smoothness of released function
from Figure 1.
We consider classification and regression schemes in which the datasets D = {z1, . . . , zn} with zi =
(xi, yi), where xi ∈ [0, 1]d are some covariates, and yi is some kind of label, either taking values on
{−1,+1} in the case of classification or some taking values in some interval when the goal is regression.
Thus the output functions are from [0, 1]d to a subset of R. The functions we are interested in take the
form
fD = arg min
g∈H
1
n
∑
zi∈D
`(g, zi) + λ‖g‖2H (12)
where H is some RKHS to be determined, and ` is the so-called “loss function.” We now recall a definition
from [7] (using M in place of their σ to prevent confusion):
Definition 4.1 (M -admissible loss function: see [7]). A loss function: `(g, z) = c(g(x), y) is called
M -admissible whenever c it is convex in its first argument and Lipschitz with constant M in its first
argument.
We will now demonstrate that for (12), whenever the loss function is admissible, the minimizers on
adjacent datasets may be bounded close together in RKHS norm. Denote the part of the optimization
due to the loss function:
LD(f) =
1
n
∑
zi∈D
`(f, zi).
Using the technique from the proof of lemma 20 of [7] we find that since ` is convex in its first argument
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we have
LD(fD + ηδD′,D)− LD(fD) ≤ η(LD(fD′)− LD(fD)),
where η ∈ [0, 1] and we use δD′,D = fD′ − fD. This also holds when fD and fD′ swap places. Summing
the resulting inequality with the above and rearranging yields
LD(fD′ − ηδD′,D)− LD(fD′) ≤ LD(fD)− LD(fD + ηδD′,D).
Due to the definition of fD, fD′ as the minimizers of their respective functionals we have
LD(fD) + λ‖fD‖2H ≤ LD(fD + ηδD′,D) + λ‖fD + ηδD′,D‖2H
LD′(fD′) + λ‖fD′‖2H ≤ LD′(fD′ − ηδD′,D) + λ‖fD′ − ηδD′,D‖2H.
This leads to the inequalities
0 ≥ λ (‖fD‖2H − ‖fD + ηδD′,D‖2H + ‖fD′‖2H − ‖fD′ − ηδD′,D‖2H)
+ LD(fD)− LD(fD + ηδD′,D + LD′(fD′)− LD′(fD′ − ηδD′,D)
≥ 2λ‖ηδD′,D‖2H − LD(fD′) + LD(fD′ − ηδD′,D) + LD′(fD′)− LD′(fD′ − ηδD′,D)
= 2λ‖ηδD′,D‖2H +
1
n
(
`(z, fD′)− `(z, fD′ − ηδD′,D) + `(z′, fD′)− `(z′, fD′ − ηδD′,D)
)
.
Moving the loss function term to the other side and using the Lipschitz property we finally obtain that
‖fD − fD′‖2H ≤
M
λn
‖fD − fD′‖∞.
What’s more, the reproducing property together with Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yields
|fD(x)− fD′(x)| = | 〈fD − fD′ ,Kx〉H | ≤ ‖fD − fD′‖H
√
K(x, x).
Combining with the previous result gives
‖fD − fD′‖2H ≤
M
λn
‖fD − fD′‖H
√
sup
x
K(x, x),
which, in turn, leads to
‖fD − fD′‖H ≤ M
λn
√
sup
x
K(x, x).
For a soft-margin kernel SVM we have the loss function: `(g, z) = (1− yg(x))+, which means the positive
part of the term in parentheses. Since the label y takes on either plus or minus one, we find this to be
1-admissible. An example of a kernel SVM in T = R2 is shown in Figure 3.
5 Algorithms
There are two main modes in which functions fD could be released by the holder of the data D to the
outside parties. The first is a “batch” setting in which the parties designate some finite collection of
points x1 . . . , xn ∈ T . The database owner computes f˜D(xi) for each i and return the vector of results.
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Figure 3: An example of a kernel support vector machine. In the top image are the data points, with the
colors representing the two class labels. The background color corresponds to the class predicted by the
learned kernel svm. In the bottom image are the same data points, with the predictions of the private
kernel svm. This example uses the Gaussian kernel for classification.
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At this point the entire transaction would end with only the collection of pairs (xi, f˜D(xi)) being known
to the outsiders. An alternative is the “online” setting in which outside users repeatedly specify points
in xi ∈ T , the database owner replies with f˜D(xi), but unlike the former setting he remains available to
respond to more requests for function evaluations. We name these settings “batch” and “online” for their
resemblance of the batch and online settings typically considered in machine learning algorithms.
The batch method is nothing more than sampling a multivariate Gaussian, since the set x1, . . . , xn ∈ T
specifies the finite dimensional distribution of the Gaussian process from which to sample. The released
vector is simply f˜D(x1)...
f˜D(xn)
 ∼ N

 fD(x1)...
fD(xn)
 , c(β)∆
α
 K(x1, x1) · · · K(x1, xn)... . . . ...
K(xn, x1) · · · K(xn, xn)

 .
In the online setting, the data owner upon receiving a request for evaluation at xi would sample the
gaussian process conditioned on the samples already produced at x1, . . . , xi−1. Let
Ci =
 K(x1, x1) · · · K(x1, xi−1)... . . . ...
K(xi−1, x1) · · · K(xi−1, xi−1)
 , Gi =
 f˜D(x1)...
f˜D(xi−1)
 , Vi =
 K(x1, xi)...
K(xi−1, xi)
 .
Then,
f˜D(xi) ∼ N
(
V Ti C
−1
i Gi, K(xi, xi)− V Ti C−1i Vi
)
.
The database owner may track the inverse matrix C−1i and after each request update it into C
−1
i+1 by
making use of Schurs Complements combined with the matrix inversion lemma. Nevertheless we note
that as i increases the computational complexity of answering the request will in general grow. In the
very least, the construction of Vi takes time proportional to i. This may make this approach problematic
to implement in practise. However we note that when using the covariance kernel
K(x, y) = exp {−γ |x− y|1}
that a more efficient algorithm presents itself. This is the kernel considered in section 4.2. Due to the
above form of K, we find that for x < y < z we have: K(x, z) = K(x, y)K(y, z). Therefore in using the
above algorithm we would find that Vi is always contained in the span of at most two rows of Ci. This is
most evident when, for instance, xi < minj<i xj . In this case let m = arg minj<i xj Vi = K(xi, xm)Ci(m),
in which Ci(m) means the m
th row of Ci. Therefore C
−1
i Vi will be a sparse vector with exactly one non-
zero entry (taking value K(x, xm)) in the m
th position. Similar algebra applies whenever xi falls between
two previous points, in which case Vi lays in the span of the two rows corresponding to the closest point
on the left and the closest on the right. Using the above kernel with some choice of γ let
ρ(x, y) = eγ|x−y| − e−γ|x−y|.
Let ξ(xi) = f˜D(xi)−fD(xi) represent the noise process. We find that the conditional distribution of ξ(xi)
to be Normal with mean and variance given by:
Eξ(xi) =

K(xi, x(1))ξ(x(1)) xi < x(1)
K(xi, x(i−1))ξ(x(i−1)) xi > x(i−1)
ρ(x(j+1),xi)
ρ(x(j),x(j+1))
ξ(x(j)) +
ρ(x(j),xi)
ρ(x(j),x(j+1))
ξ(x(j+1)) x(j) < xi < x(j+1),
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and
Var[f˜D(xi)] =

1−K(x, x(1))2 xi < x(1)
1−K(x, x(i−1))2 xi > x(i−1)
1−K(x, x(j)) ρ(x(j+1),xi)ρ(x(j),x(j+1)) −K(x, x(j+1))
ρ(x(j),xi)
ρ(x(j),x(j+1))
x(j) < xi < x(j+1),
where x(1) < x(2) < · · · < x(i−1) are the points x1, . . . , xi−1 after being sorted into increasing order. In
using the above algorithm it is only necessary for the data owner to store the values xi and f˜D(xi). When
using the proper data structures e.g., a sorted doubly linked list for the xi it is possible to determine
the mean and variance using the above technique in time proportional to log(i) which is a significant
improvement over the general linear time scheme above (note that the linked list is suggested since then
it is possible to update the list in constant time).
6 Conclusion
We have shown how to add random noise to a function in such a way that differential privacy is preserved.
It would be interesting to study this method in the many applications of functional data analysis [23].
On a more theoretical note, we have not addressed the issue of lower bounds. Specifically, we can ask:
Given that we want to release a differentially private function, what is the least amount of noise that
must necessarily be added in order to preserve differential privacy? This question has been addressed in
detail for real-valued, count-valued and vector-valued data. However, those techniques apply to the case
of β = 0 whereupon the family {PD} are all mutually absolutely continuous. In the case of β > 0 which
we consider this no longer applies and so the determination of lower bounds is complicated (for example,
since quantities such as the KL divergence are no longer bounded).
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Note that invertibility of the matrix is safely assumed due to Mercer’s
theorem. Denote the matrix by M−1. Denote by P the operator H → H defined by
P =
n∑
i=1
Kxi
n∑
j=1
(M−1)i,j
〈
Kxj , ·
〉
H
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We find this operator to be idempotent in the sense that P = P 2:
P 2 =
n∑
i=1
Kxi
n∑
j=1
(M−1)i,j
〈
Kxj ,
n∑
k=1
Kxk
n∑
l=1
(M−1)k,l 〈Kxl , ·〉H
〉
H
=
n∑
i=1
Kxi
n∑
j=1
(M−1)i,j
n∑
k=1
〈
Kxj ,Kxk
〉
H
n∑
l=1
(M−1)k,l 〈Kxl , ·〉H
=
n∑
i=1
Kxi
n∑
j=1
(M−1)i,j
n∑
k=1
Mj,k
n∑
l=1
(M−1)k,l 〈Kxl , ·〉H
=
n∑
i=1
Kxi
n∑
l=1
(M−1)i,l 〈Kxl , ·〉H
= P.
P is also self-adjoint due to the symmetry of M , i.e.
〈Pf, g〉H =
〈
n∑
i=1
Kxi
n∑
j=1
(M−1)i,j
〈
Kxj , f
〉
H , g
〉
H
=
〈
n∑
i=1
〈Kxi , g〉H
n∑
j=1
(M−1)i,jKxj , f
〉
H
=
〈
n∑
j=1
Kxj
n∑
i=1
(M−1)i,j 〈Kxi , g〉H , f
〉
H
=
〈
n∑
j=1
Kxj
n∑
i=1
(M−1)j,i 〈Kxi , g〉H , f
〉
H
= 〈Pg, f〉H .
Therefore,
‖f‖2H = 〈f, f〉H
= 〈Pf + (f − Pf), Pf + (f − Pf)〉H
= 〈Pf, Pf〉H + 2 〈Pf, f − Pf〉H + 〈f − Pf, f − Pf〉H
= 〈Pf, Pf〉H + 2
〈
f, Pf − P 2f〉H + 〈f − Pf, f − Pf〉H
= 〈Pf, Pf〉H + 〈f − Pf, f − Pf〉H
≥ 〈Pf, Pf〉H
= 〈f, Pf〉H .
The latter term is nothing more than the left hand side in the statement. In summary the quantity in the
statement of the theorem is just the square RKHS norm in the restriction of H to the subspace spanned
by the functions Kxi . 
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